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Introduction
The four year period after the EU enlargement of 2004 was an unusual time for the three Baltic countries. Economic growth had been fostered by several factors including the benefits of the common market; substantial injections from EU structural funds; and strong domestic demand driven by a credit boom in both the real estate and consumer durables markets. Overall real GDP growth during [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] was 36%, 38% and 48% in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, respectively. Unemployment fell and total employment rose in each of the three countries, although in varying degrees.
One of the defining features of this period was the outflow of a significant part of the labor force: thousands of workers were quick to use the right to work in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden, and later, other countries of the 'old' Europe. This negative demographic shock was very painful for the Baltic countries, which lost significant proportions of their populations (from 6% for Lithuania to 13% -14% for Latvia and Estonia) during the 15 years preceding accession because of negative net migration and, except for Lithuania, negative natural increase (World Bank 2007: p. 115 ).
Large and growing Lithuanian and Latvian diasporas have emerged in Ireland, where they are among the top five groups of foreign nationals, and the UK. Estonian diaspora in Finland is second only to the Russian one and has been first by net migration since 2004. Flows of return migrants attracted by improving possibilities at home, flows of new migrants triggered by the network effect, as well as repeated and seasonal migration has strengthened the informal links between the diasporas and home population.
Migration has contributed to a decline in unemployment and real wage growth in general, as well as improvements in the labor market position of ethnic minorities and the low-skilled. Through these channels and through remittances migration has thus helped to improve living standards.
However, migration-induced labor shortages in some sectors have been obstacles to growth. Migration has also changed the distribution of bargaining power in the labor marker in favor of employees.
While this change was often a necessary correction in countries with weak unions (see Masso and Eamets 2006: Table 5 .5), in some cases (notably construction) it went too far and contributed to labor costs rising too fast.
Some of the migration effects, both good and bad, went beyond the labor market. One example is deteriorating (at least temporarily) quality and in some cases falling productivity in sectors affected by labor shortages, e.g. retail, catering, construction and health. On the other hand, labor shortages motivate firms to invest in new capital and improve human resource management, which leads to increases in productivity.
One of the most intriguing questions about the post-enlargement migration wave from the Baltic countries is the behavior of Russian-speaking minorities, many of whom do not have citizenship in Estonia and Latvia; and hence, they are not covered by the free mobility provisions.
The above discussion highlights the prominent role of post-enlargement migration for the Baltic countries (and for the countries which host Baltic migrants) from demographic, economic and social perspectives. In this chapter, we discuss in detail the dynamics and composition of the Baltic migration and return migration flows before and after EU accession. We also look at the labor market outcomes of migrants and return migrants and at migration impacts on the Baltic economies and societies.
We refer to Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2010) for an overview of the literature on post-enlargement migration within EU. Few papers have looked specifically at the Baltic countries in this context. A study by Hazans (2003a) based on cross-country comparison of inter-regional migration rates concludes that the Baltic populations are more mobile than those of the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Hazans (2003b) employs a survey of internet users to study their migration intensions, as well as the determinants of temporary and permanent migration. Kallaste and Philips (2004) , SKDS (2006a) and Järv (2007) 
study migration intensions in Estonia and
Latvia. Kaczmarczyk and Okólsky (2008) Kadziauskas (2007) and Nurmela (2008) look at migration policies and attitudes. studies labor market outcomes of return migrants in Latvia.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources. The dynamics and intensity of the Baltic migration flows before and after accession are presented in section 3. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to migrant human capital and their labor market outcomes.
Return migration and labor market transitions are analyzed in section 6, followed by a discussion of the migration impact on the Baltic economies in section 7. Section 8 deals with the demographic composition of migrant flows and stocks, as well as with determinants of migration and returning.
Section 9 discusses remittances. The main findings are summarized in section 10. The concluding section looks into the future of Baltic migration in the context of economic crisis.
Data
In order to describe various aspects of the migration process before and after EU accession, as well as to provide cross-country comparisons, we use several complementary data sources. Administrative data on gross migration flows into the UK (National Insurance numbers and Worker Registration Scheme), Ireland (Personal Public Service Numbers) and other EEA countries (international migration statistics) are used to measure the intensity of the migration and outline a migrant profile along basic demographic and other available dimensions. For Ireland, we also use the 2006 Population Census data.
For a deeper analysis we exploit Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian LFS data files (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) .
LFS data include a sufficient number of observations on migrant workers abroad: 1844 for Lithuania, 577 for Latvia, and 800 for Estonia. These numbers increase further if those with some economic activity abroad within the last year are considered. The data also has a sufficient number of observations on return migrants with foreign work experience: 313 for Lithuania, 185 for Latvia, and 136 for Estonia. By design, the data do not cover migrants who have already become permanent, i.e.
are not considered as household members at home, and those with no family left behind. However, the distribution of movers found in pre-accession and post-accession LFS data by host countries is consistent with the geography of actual migration flows. The UK and Ireland have become major destinations for Lithuanian and Latvian movers, and Finland plays a similar role for Estonia (see Tables 1a, 1b) . Table 1b also confirms that labor migration to countries outside the EEA accounted for less than 10% of the total in both 2002-2003 and after accession. This justifies our decision to restrict analysis of administrative data to EEA countries. While formally sending countries' LFS data capture only temporary migrants, one should keep in mind that the post-accession migration from EU-10 countries has been predominantly temporary so far (see Pollard et al., 2008: Figure 20 and pp. 39-40; Barrell et al., 2007: p. 5; European Commission, 2008: pp. 121-122) , and that temporary migrants tend to become permanent (see e.g. van Baalen and Müller, 2009, for Germany) . This suggests that our LFS data are suitable for cross-country comparisons, for analyzing accession-induced and postaccession changes in migrant characteristics, and for studying migrant labor market transitions.
Whenever possible, we also support our findings with the Irish Census data, which include both temporary and permanent migrants.
When relevant, we also employ data from representative surveys conducted in Estonia in 2003 and 2006 (see Kallaste and Philips, 2004; Järv, 2007) ) and Latvia in 2005 Latvia in -2008 (see Notes to Tables 2,   4 ), which include information on migration intentions and foreign work experience. Some of these are based on very large samples and hence allow for a detailed analysis when LFS data are not sufficient.
For instance, one of the Latvian surveys includes data on more than a thousand relatives economically active abroad, with more than half having moved after accession. Another sample of over 10 thousand respondents includes data on 467 persons with post-accession foreign work experience. Results presented here are mostly based on our own calculations.
Intensity and main destinations of the post-enlargement migration
The removal of restrictions on labor mobility of those from the new member states by the UK and Ireland in 2004 triggered an almost immediate migration response. As is now well documented (see.
e.g. Baas, Brücker and Hauptmann, 2010; European Commission 2008: chapter 3; UK Home Office 2008) , the majority of migrants were temporary, staying in the receiving countries from several months to several years. In most cases, migrants from the Baltic countries did not withdraw from population registers in their home countries. Therefore, standard emigration rates evaluated in the sending countries are not suitable for analysis. Various surveys, including LFS, conducted in sending countries tend to under-sample migrant households. Receiving country statistics is more relevant. One approach (Baas, Brücker and Hauptmann, 2010; see also European Commission, 2008) is to look at the dynamics of stocks of NMS nationals in the receiving countries using LFS data. According to this methodology, during the four post-enlargement years (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) Baas, Brücker and Hauptmann (2010) based on stock estimates and with countries' pre-accession income and unemployment levels (see Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2010) ; however, flowbased ranking 'favors' Poland and Latvia and suggests that migration from these countries has been of more temporary nature on average than migration from Lithuania, Poland and the Slovak Republic. As far as the three Baltic countries are concerned, higher mobility by Lithuanians might have to do with a very low share of unemployed receiving benefits (Hazans 2007a : Figure 2 ) -on top of unemployment rate being initially higher by two points than in Estonia and Latvia.
Two more remarks should be made regarding the cross-country comparisons. First, as concerns individual mobility, population covered by the free mobility provisions (rather than the total population) might be a more appropriate base for calculating the migration rates. This amounts to excluding Latvian and Estonian non-citizens, resulting in an increase of emigration rates for these countries by a quarter ( 
Human capital of the migrants
Proportions of former unemployed and inactive individuals among migrants serve as important indicators of the type of labor market experience they bring to the host country as well as provide lower bounds to the migration effect on unemployment and participation rates in the sending countries. In the first two years after the EU enlargement of 2004, 11% to 13% of migrants from Lithuania and Estonia and 15% of their Latvian counterparts were unemployed in the home country in the previous year and about 7% were either students or pupils. These proportions exceed the ones observed among stayers by a factor of three to four, indicating that work abroad has been an important coping strategy for the Baltic unemployed or potential unemployed (see Figure 2 ). In the following two years, the proportion of former unemployed stayed roughly unchanged among Lithuanian From the labor market perspective (both in sending and receiving countries), skill level and occupation are the most significant characteristics of the migrants. Table 1b ), which is consistent with the results in Table 1a . Three messages are evident from the Figure. First, most of the migrants (two thirds to three quarters) had secondary education. Second, enlargement changed the skill composition of migrants: before enlargement, Lithuanian migrants had the same skill distribution as stayers, while Latvian and Estonian migrants were more educated on average than stayers. Postaccession migrants from all three countries are significantly less educated than stayers, and the gap tends to increase over time 7 . Third, post-accession return migrants are more educated than migrants, stayers and pre-accession returnees.
Note that sending countries' LFS data include only migrants still considered as household members at home, i.e. mostly temporary migrants. However, the above findings are also supported by other data sources. First, we also include in Figure 3 results from the Irish population Census 2006 based on both temporary and permanent migrants (whose education has ceased) from Lithuania (more than 13 thousands) and Latvia (more than 8 thousands). The low educated accounted for 20% of Lithuanian migrants and 18% of their Latvian counterparts. Among economically active stayers in the same group, these proportions were just 9% and 15%, respectively. On the other hand, the incidence of high education was substantially lower among migrants: 23% vs. 29.5% for Lithuania and 18% vs.
22% for Latvia.
The fact that incidence of tertiary education among Baltic migrants is lower than among stayers contrasts with an opposite finding for migrants from the EU-10 in general (European Commission, 2008: Ch. 3, Chart 22) .
Available data on migrants' occupation before moving point in the same direction. former manual workers and fewer former highly skilled non-manual workers and students than among migrants arriving in EEA countries during the previous years. When compared to stayers, postenlargement migrants feature higher proportions of former unskilled manual workers, low skilled nonmanual (service and shop) workers and former pupils or students, and a much lower proportion (one eighth as opposed to one third) of former highly skilled non-manual workers. Before enlargement about two fifths of migrants went to countries at that time outside the EEA. This was the former Soviet Union in most, but not all, of the cases. These migrants were significantly more skilled than those heading to Western Europe as well as than those who stayed. The same pattern is found also in [2004] [2005] , although the number of such migrants has fallen dramatically.
Yet another approach is to look at the composition of flows rather than stocks, and this leads to similar conclusions. For instance, according to a survey on undeclared emigration conducted by 7 Fouarge and Ester (2007, Table   2 ). The majority of post-enlargement potential movers (57% to 70% in Latvia, 64% to 74% in Estonia) have secondary education (Table 2 , panel B). In Latvia, the structural break in composition of potential movers (from more to less educated than stayers) seems to have taken place in the second part of 2005 (see col.
[5]- [8] in Table 2 , panel C). According to a large-scale survey conducted on the eve of 2007, the proportion of low-skilled among potential movers exceeds that among stayers by 5.3 points, whereas it is the opposite for the proportion of highly skilled. This pattern also holds, albeit in a weaker form, when only potential movers who have made some preparations are considered (see col.
[9], [10] in Table 2 Table 2 , panels B, C).
The above results do not imply that the low skill level as such has been a factor promoting migration, other things equal. The skill composition of migrants is certainly affected by age and geographical origin. When these and other relevant factors (including selection into not living in a one-person household) are controlled for, medium-educated workers are most likely to move. During the post-accession period, the effect of low (vs. medium) education on mobility shows positive trends in Latvia and Estonia; Lithuania features a negative trend in the effect of higher education on mobility.
In summary, human capital in all three countries has become less pro-migration after accession than it was before, and was becoming even less pro-migration during the post-accession period.
Labor market outcomes
Labor market status. According to host country LFS results, migrants from the EU-10 to the EU-15
'show higher labor market participation and employment rates than the overall populations both in the sending and receiving countries; in fact, 78% of those migrants aged 15-64 are employed (European Commission, 2008: Ch. 3, Chart 17; p. 129) . In the UK, the major destination country for Baltic migrants, the employment rate of migrants from A8 countries (men aged 16-64 and women aged 16-59) was above 80% in 2005/Q3 and above 84% in 2008/Q3 (ONS, 2008) . Specifically for Lithuanian migrants in the UK, Khan (2008) reports an employment rate of 84% for men and 80% for women, an unemployment rate 2% for men and 6% for women, and an inactivity rate of 14% for both genders in 2008/Q2. Employment rates of Lithuanian and Latvian nationals in Ireland were between 82% and 83% according to the 2006 Population Census data. The unemployment rates (9% to 10%) were higher than in the UK; and the inactivity rates at 8% to 9% were lower (see CSO Ireland, 2008) . Estonian migrants in Finland have seen much better labor market outcomes that immigrants from other countries before accession due to a good command of the Finnish language as well as the similarity of the two cultures: Sutela (2005) Finally, the share of highly skilled non-manual workers (managers, professionals and technicians) has dropped sharply compared to the pre-accession period: from 15% to 6% among Lithuanian migrants, from 43% to 17% among Latvian migrants and from 27% to 13% among Estonian migrants. Results
from the Irish Population Census 2006 based on almost 16 thousand Lithuanian and over 9 thousand
Latvian migrants are presented in the same figure and provide a picture broadly similar to the LFSbased one. The Irish data feature fewer unskilled manual and more low-skilled non-manual workers than the LFS data for Lithuania; and more skilled manual and low skilled non-manual workers at the expense of highly skilled non-manual workers for Latvia. These differences may reflect differences between sectoral distribution of migrants in Ireland and the UK (discussed below), as well as specifics of the sending countries LFS data (which do not cover permanent migrants, as well as those with no family left behind) and sampling errors.
Distributions of Lithuanian and Latvian workers in Ireland by the four broad groups of occupations are statistically indistinguishable. This similarity also holds for economic activities: over half of the males worked in construction and manufacturing industries, while retail work, hotels and restaurants accounted for almost half of the female employment (CSO Ireland, 2008: Table A5 ). Despite the fact that the UK and Ireland host over three quarters of Lithuanian and Latvian migrants, the sectoral distribution described above might be distorted by a rather big share of 35% to 40% of Baltic workers in the UK in an unknown sector of employment because most of them work for recruitment agencies (see the UK Home Office, 2008: Table 11 ). Moreover, the British Worker Registration Scheme excludes the self-employed, which is a small group among Baltic migrants (see As one would expect, the share of agricultural employment (17%, 12% and 8% among Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian migrants, respectively) according to the annual average stock data is much lower than the British flow data but higher than in the Irish April stock data. However, the total share of agriculture and industry among post-accession migrants (from one half to three fifths) is well in line with the previous data sources and significantly higher than among all migrants from the EU-10 (about two fifths according to European Commission, 2008: Ch. 3, Table 9 ). A comparison with the preaccession period reveals that the share of industrial employment among Baltic migrants has significantly increased for all three countries. This has been at the expense of agriculture in the Lithuanian case and at the expense of services for Latvia and Estonia.
Over-qualification and occupational mobility. Immigrant skills might be not immediately utilized to their full extent in the host country labor market, either because of the specifics of the latter or the lack of complementary skills, such as fluency in the local language (Dustmann et al 2008 these data, however, exclude the UK, Ireland and Germany -countries which host most of the recent migrants from the EU-10). . This is very much in line with the over-qualification rates reported above. As far as movers who held medium-skilled jobs at home are concerned, their downward occupational mobility rate is similar to the over-qualification rate among those who moved before accession. It exceeds 50% for those who moved in 2004-2005, which is well above the over-qualification rate documented in Figure   7 . This could be because the latter group was to some extent under-qualified at home or because of custom occupation classification used in the survey. In any case, there is no evidence that overqualified movers were already overqualified at home.
Type of work. Work-related characteristics of movers and stayers by country and period are summarized in Figure 8 . A small, but not negligible, proportion of movers have been assigned supervisory responsibilities: 3% among Lithuanians, up to 5% among Latvians and up to 10% among Estonians.
Part-time work and on-the-job search have been virtually absent among the migrant workers.
Length of stay abroad, return migration and labor market transitions
It is well documented that the post-accession migration from EU-10 countries has been (up to 2008) predominantly temporary or circulatory. About two thirds of workers registered in the UK WRS intended to stay for no more than one year (Pollard et al., 2008: Figure 20 Figure 2 .7) provide evidence that after EU accession, the proportion of Polish migrants staying abroad for less than a year increased sharply and stayed above three fifths for two years, then fell somewhat but remained above one half. finds that by the beginning of 2007 almost 5% of the economically active
Latvian population had worked abroad over the last three years, and 12% had family members with such experience.
We refer to Dustmann (1997 Dustmann ( , 2003 , Dustmann and Weiss (2007) It should be noted that non-economic motives play an important role. Return migration is closely related to migrant transitions between employment and other labor market states: the latter often is either a reason for or a result of the former. In this section, we provide survey-based evidence on both issues with regards to recent mobile Baltic nationals. Table 2 for details) only 35% stayed abroad for up to one year and 28% for one to two years.
LFS-based data on return migration and labor market transitions of employed Baltic movers are summarized in Figure 10 . While more than half of Latvian movers return to home country within a year, this is the case for less than two fifths of their Lithuanian counterparts and just over one quarter of Estonian migrant workers. The relatively low propensity to return among Estonians is consistent with longer stays reported above, as well as with the findings on the incidence of short tenure in Figure 8 .
One out of five Lithuanian and Latvian workers abroad and one out of ten Estonian employed movers become unemployed or inactive a year later, most of them in the home country. Among employed stayers, these proportions are much lower: 5% to 7% in Lithuania and Latvia, 4% in Estonia (Figure 10 ). Among return migrants with some foreign work experience during the last two years, inactivity rates are even higher: almost 40% in Lithuania, more than 20% in Latvia and almost 20% in Estonia ( Figure 11 ). This should not be interpreted as evidence for a weak labor market position of returnees. One reason for high inactivity and unemployment among return migrants is the fact that due to accumulated savings, they can afford extended periods of inactivity and a longer job search (according to a recent study, 70% of return migrants in Latvia spend part of the earnings from abroad for everyday needs (University of Latvia, 2007, Table 4 .15). Another reason is that many return migrants plan to work abroad again and take no job (or only temporary job) while at home. Indeed, according to a survey conducted in Latvia on the eve of 2007 (see Notes to Table 2 for details), 27%
of return migrants and just 7% of stayers are ready to go to work abroad.
Characteristics of return migrants differ from those of all migrant workers in many respects.
As documented in Figure 3 , return migrants are more educated. In terms of occupations, they are clearly more skilled than all movers on average but somewhat less skilled than stayers ( Figure 5 ).
Returnees are less often than movers 'too educated' for their jobs (Figure 7) , although in Lithuania their over-qualification rate is higher than that of stayers (in Latvia and Estonia the latter effect is within the margin of error). shows that after controlling for workers' demographic characteristics and education, as well as for foreign and unemployment experience of their family members, returnees command a substantial earnings' premium: 15% on average, with more than 20% among men and 6% among women. Accounting for a variety of job characteristics leaves the gap almost unchanged. The earnings gain of the average return migrant is shown to be entirely caused by foreign experience. There is, however, a great deal of individual heterogeneity: in the upper quartile of the earnings distribution, the unexplained gap in favor of return migrants exceeds 40%, while in the bottom quartile it is negative. This is consistent with the coexistence of success, failure and opportunity stories behind return decisions. Preliminary results suggest that Estonian returnees earn about 30% more than otherwise similar stayers despite concentrating in the bottom part of the earnings distribution.
Job-related characteristics of employed return migrants are compared with that of movers and stayers in Figure 8 . One in five employed return migrants in Lithuania and one in eight in Latvia are self-employed. These rates are in line with those found among stayers and are much higher than among migrant workers abroad. By contrast, as LFS data suggest, Estonian returnees are not likely to become self-employed. Lithuanian and Estonian returnees are much less likely than stayers to hold supervisory jobs, while it is the other way around in Latvia. The incidence of temporary contracts and short tenure among returnees is much higher than among stayers but not as high as among movers, except for short tenure in Estonia. Returnees have similar working hours to stayers. One in ten employed Lithuanian and Estonian returnees look for another main job, which is a much higher rate than among stayers.
Migration impact on the Baltic labor markets and economies
Economic theory suggests several channels through which migration possibilities and actual migration affect the sending country's labor market. New emigration options reduce labor supply and make it more elastic, thus increasing wages and narrowing the gap between the marginal productivity of labor and pay (see Figures 10.1, 10 .5 and the discussion in Ehrenberg and Smith, 2006) . Unemployment goes down because those unemployed or inactive move abroad (up to 20% of post-accession movers
were not employed a year ago according to Figure 2 ) or fill the vacancies left behind by previously employed migrants 9 . The latter process, of course, results in a rising vacancy rate because it takes time for vacancies to be filled. Labor shortages may develop in some segments of the labor market when the unemployed lack the skills required by employers and cannot replace the movers (see Rutkowski, 2007 for discussion and evidence). Note, however, that such cases were clearly not the dominant ones across the whole of the economy, otherwise unemployment rates would have increased, while employment rates would have fallen -a scenario opposite to the one observed in reality. points for Lithuania, 2.4 points for Latvia and 1.0 point for Estonia; whereas the estimated impact on inflation is 0.8, 0.8 and 0.2 points, respectively. In our opinion, the true effects on unemployment and wages might be higher than the ones based on macro-models. For instance, evidence from Figure 2 suggests that the direct effects of flows from unemployment and inactivity to foreign countries might alone explain the declines in the unemployment rates of the sizes quoted above, without accounting for replacement flows. Macro-models do not account for the monopsonistic structure of the labor market, in particular the threat of a substantial fall in labor productivity when a firm loses not just a marginal worker but, say, half its workforce. Scale effect, work organization problems, and the inability to compete for publicly financed projects can all be underlying factors. Underestimated wage effects and ignoring the deterioration of hiring standards lead to an underestimate of the resulting return migration and an increase in labor force participation, especially if assumed labor supply elasticities are derived from data with modest wage changes.
Assuming that emigration from high-unemployment regions (which, according to the wage curve are also low wage regions, see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Brücker and Jahn, 2008 ) is more intensive, regional disparities in unemployment and wages should be reduced by external mobility. This is found for Latvia in Hazans (2007b) 
Demographics of the Baltic migration
Composition of the flows and stocks in the host countries. Demographic profiles and determinants of temporary and return migration. This sub-section is based on Figure 11 , which compares demographic profiles of Baltic temporary migrants found in the LFS data with that of stayers and return migrants. In addition, we discuss results from Hazans (forthcoming) on the determinants of mobility 15 and data on migration intensions from Table 2 .
Females account for one fifth to one third of post-enlargement temporary workers -much less than according to host country statistics. The following offer some explanations: (i) men are more likely to stay abroad permanently or for prolonged periods; (ii) male movers are more likely to be considered as gone from their households of origin; (iii) female movers are less likely to leave family behind (i.e. more likely to be tied movers or to live alone before moving). The proportion of females among return migrants in Lithuania is similar to that among migrants, while in Latvia, and especially Estonia, it is higher. This suggests that men are less likely to return on average. After controlling for other factors, a positive female effect on returning is indeed found in Estonia; whereas in Lithuania and Latvia, the effect is negative for childless women. Latvian women with children under 15 are more likely to return than men, other things equal. In line with data on migration intensions reported in Table 2 and results of other studies (see Blanchflower and Shadforth, 2009: Table 6 ) finds a slightly negative (significant for women)
causal effect of foreign experience on having a partner among return migrants in Latvia. As shown in Other things equal, the propensity to move declines with age in all three Baltic countries.
However, about one third of Lithuanian and Latvian temporary migrants, as well as return migrants, are older than 35. The Estonian picture is different: about half of the migrants but just a quarter of the returnees are older than 35, suggesting that younger migrants are more likely to return. Indeed, after controlling for other factors, the likelihood of return reaches its minimum at 50 years of age (note that nine out of ten migrants are younger than 50). The age effect on Latvian migrant propensity to return is also negative, while it has an inverse U shape with maximum at 40 for Lithuanian migrants.
One of the most intriguing questions about the post-enlargement migration wave from the Baltic countries is the behavior of Russian-speaking minorities, many of whom in Estonia and Latvia do not have citizenship; and hence, they are not covered by the free mobility provisions (see Kahanec and Zaiceva (2009) for a study on the citizenship effects on labor market outcomes in Europe).
Regarding migration intentions 'in the near future' or supported by specific steps, the proportion of potential movers among minority populations in general is somewhat lower than among the titular population in Latvia but higher in Estonia (Table 2 , col.
[3] and [8] [9] [10] ). In both countries minority citizens were, however, more inclined to move than the titular population, but it was the other way around for non-citizens. This citizenship effect is much more pronounced in Estonia.
The proportion of minorities among Latvian migrant workers dropped from 56% before 'the true size of remittances... is believed to be larger'). Even these under-estimated amounts, while being a relatively small part of Baltic countries' GDP at 2% to 2.5%, are substantial from the receiving families' perspective. For instance, according to two independent surveys conducted in Latvia, 7.2% of population in 2007 and 6.5% in 2008 had family members working abroad at the time of the survey (Table 4 ). In 2007, therefore, the $219 meant $3000 for each person with a migrant worker in the family. Overall, about two thirds of Latvian migrant workers were sending money home between 2004-2006 and 2006-2008 (Table 4) . About two thirds of return migrants from the UK and Ireland used foreign earnings for everyday needs; almost 30% invested in housing; 19% in a car; 22% in other durables; and 11% in education. Figure 14 confirms the role of remittances in improving the standards of living in Estonia: both before and after accession, the proportion of households facing financial difficulties is significantly lower among those with family members working abroad.
Conclusions
The Table 13 ; Barrett et al. 2008 : Table 7) 16 , which certainly adds to their competitiveness, especially amid crises. Recent measures by the British government to restrict access of non-EEA nationals to the UK labor market (see UK Border Agency 2009) will help Baltic workers as well. Baltic migrants interviewed acknowledge that life has become more difficult since the start of recession, but they cope well and look into future with optimism -something most of the stayers lack nowadays.
The essence of what they say is: if you are not afraid of hard and in some cases unpleasant work, you will finally find a job -or won't lose one in the first place. They also emphasize the increasing importance of local language skills.
Post-accession migrant flows from the Baltics were predominantly temporary and circulatory.
This pattern was most pronounced in the Latvian case, while Estonian migrants showed relatively low propensity to return and longer periods of stay in the host countries. Moreover, the flows to the UK and Ireland declined after 2005, which is unlike similar flows from Poland and the Slovak Republic.
However, big and growing Lithuanian and Latvian diasporas have emerged in the UK and Ireland, and a big Estonian diaspora in Finland 17 . Media and case studies evidence 18 describe a rich social infrastructure within these diasporas: weekly newspapers published in Lithuanian, Latvian and Russian; Sunday schools in all three Baltic languages and Russian; regular Lithuanian and Latvian schools in Ireland, and Estonian schools in Finland and Sweden; language courses, sport teams, discos, concerts and other activities; numerous NGOs (including religious communities); professional networks with informal meetings at certain bars or Eastern-European and Russian shops etc. In each host country, the Baltic diasporas interact with other East Europeans, using Russian to communicate.
The above considerations suggest, moreover, that a new wave of emigration is likely to emerge. The director of a recruiting company in Latvia says: "We have returned to the situation of 2004, when thousands were leaving Latvia. We are struggling to serve all clients that knock at the doors, calls or send us e-mails. A typical client is a man aged 30 to 40 ready for whatever type of work and nor very demanding in terms of pay" (Mazan 2009 ). This is echoed by a colleague at a company which offers placements in the UK, the Netherlands and Scandinavia in sectors such as agriculture, shipping and distribution: "Interest in working abroad had skyrocketed in recent months, particularly amongst people aged 20 to 30, both unskilled workers and professionals, many of whom have been laid off or struggling to repay debts" (McIntosh, 2009) .
Note that the psychological cost of moving is much lower now than five years ago. According to surveys conducted in Latvia between 2006-2008 (see Table 4 ), at least 5% of working-age population are post-accession return migrants; 12% have a family member with recent foreign work experience; and more than 70% have a friend or neighbor with such experience. Moreover, adjustment is much easier inside already existing diasporas, which also offer job opportunities for professionals and personal service workers. The chances are high that Baltic migration will become more long-term or permanent in nature, and that the proportion of high-educated migrants will grow. McIntosh (2009) reports a 26-year-old IT worker holding a master degree saying: "I don't see the way out right now actually. I am at point zero. I am just starting my career, but I don't see the structure here to develop myself in the labor market"; while a civil servant of the same age says: "Some of my friends who have no work say that they don't feel that they are needed here in their country...We all thought that we are the next generation that will change the future of the country, but now we have learnt more, we understand that nothing will change". Of course the actual size of the new emigration wave will depend on how the crisis unfolds in the Baltics and elsewhere. There is a real risk, however, that when entering the recovery, the Baltic economies might experience more severe labor shortages than before -and earlier than it was expected based on previous population projections. This highlights the relevance of recommendations made by Boeri (2008) Mazan (2009); Meiden (2009) . 19 The first steps to simplify procedures related to the employment of non-EU migrant workers were made by Estonia in 2008 (see Nurmela, 2008) Notes: a Posted workers are those sent by employers to work in another country for a period of less than 12 months. Majority of Lithuanian and Latvian posted workers are in Norway, followed by Germany, Nordic countries (excl. Norway), Spain, France and Italy. Almost all Estonian posted workers are in Finland. Posted workers usually are not covered by migration statistics.
b To avoid double counting, aggregation over time is not performed. The nature of the UK and Ireland's data excludes double counting within each country. Aggregation of these flows performed on the assumption (based on evidence from the LFS data) that the number of cases when the same migrant has received social security number in both countries is negligible. -4.3* -7.1** -8.8** 4.3 -5.4* -3.8* -3.9*** -2.9 -3.5** -2.7* Notes:
a Potential movers are defined as follows: Surveys I, II -answers 'Yes, definitely' or 'Yes, with high probability' to the question about plans to work abroad (Col [3] -also a specific plan exists). Surveys III and VI -have ticked option 'Move abroad' when answering the question 'What are you ready to do in order to get a better /desirable job?'; Survey IV -'very big' or 'big' probability to go for a work a broad. Survey Vanswers "Yes" or "Rather yes" to the question "Would you like to go to work abroad?" (Col.
[8] -also have made some preparations). b Excluding long-term (one year or more) unemployed. Sources: Calculations with survey data. Surveys conducted: I and II -by SaarPoll Ltd. and Faktum & Ariko respectively, both for Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs; III -by SKDS for University of Latvia; IV -by SKDS for Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; V -by SIA "Data Serviss" for University of Latvia; VI -by GfK Baltic for Latvian University of Agriculture (V and VI were commissioned by the Ministry of Welfare in the framework of the National Program of Labor Market Studies). Figure 1 . In 2006 number of posted workers from Estonia (mostly to Finland) and Czech R. was twice as big as the gross migration flow to continental Europe; for Poland, Slovak R. and Hungary the two flows were roughly of the same size; number of postings from Lithuania and Latvia (mostly to Norway) was similar to migration flow to Germany. See Table 1c Population Census data for Ireland. Workers whose actual sector of employment was unknown are excluded. In the UK, the excluded group accounts for 35 to 40% of Baltic workers and 44% of Polish workers (mostly working for recruitment agencies), hence the results should be used with caution. By design, the WRS excludes also self-employed (a small group among Baltic migrants in the UK, see Figure 8 ), as well as Baltic nationals who do not have citizenship of their home country (up to 15% of Latvian workers abroad and up to 18% of Estonian workers abroad belong to this category, see Figure 10 ). In Ireland, the excluded (due to non-response) group is rather small: 10 to 12% for Lithuania and Latvia, 7% for Poland. The lower panel is based on sending countries' LFS data; see Notes to Figure Notes: Persons aged 18 to 64 years who have been economically active for some time during the last year are included. Return migrants have worked abroad during the last two years (three years for Latvian column '2006-2007') . Sources: Calculations with LFS data and one ad hoc Latvian survey (survey VI in Sources of Table 2 ). 
